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A REEVALUATION OF THE DECISION NOT
TO ADOPT THE UNCONSCIONABILITY
PROVISION OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE IN CALIFORNIA
On the advice of the appointed fact-finding committee the
California Legislature did not adopt the "unconscionability"
section' of the official version of the Uniform Commercial Code.2
Many scholars as well as practitioners opposed its adoption,
fearing that it would lead to unrestricted and unguided judicial
interference in the commercial arena, and believing that it posed
serious threats to the "freedom of contract." 3 This position is
supported by the obvious fact that "unconscionability" is not
defined in the Code, and no specific criteria for evaluating the
conscionability of contracts are provided. Yet, despite the
1. The Official Text reads:
Section 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded areasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect
to aid the court in making the determination.
2. In order to evaluate the proposed Official Version of the Uniform Commercial
Code the Legislature established a special Senate Fact Finding Committee. The committee
requested evaluations from several sources including the State Bar, the Banker's
Association, and Professors Marsh and Warren of the School of Law, University of
California at Los Angeles. See, text accompanying notes 39-53 infra for discussion of their
recommendations. For the complete text of the reports, discussions, and the committee's
final recommendations see the SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE BY THE
SENATE FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (1959-1961), THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as the SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT].
3. Section 2-302 has been controversial since its very inception in the early drafts of
the Uniform Commercial Code. It has provoked an extensive amount of commentary in
legal periodicals. The following are good sources for general reference and historical
background: 109 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 45 VA. L. REv. 583, 45 IA. L. REv. 843, 9 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1143,9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 367.
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controversy and prolonged debate all but two states-California
and North Carolina-have adopted section 2-302.
After the slow start 2-302 is emerging as an important aspect
of commercial law The increase in case activity as well as the
diversity of potential uses arguably compels a reevaluation of
California's position on 2-302. Thus, the purpose of this note is
to reexamine the efficacy of the arguments against the adoption
of 2-302 in light of recent judicial interpretations in other
jurisdictions and the growing importance of 2-302 in the
contemporary commercial setting.
I. DEVELOPMENT, USE AND INTERPRETATION IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
For a time the widespread adoption of 2-302 did not have a
significant impact on commercial law.! No doubt the prevailing
controversy concerning the predicted effect of 2-302 inhibited
lawyers and courts alike-caution seemed to be in order. As a
practical matter cases involving contracts which might have been
held unconscionable in whole or in part often contained interest
or credit charges in violation of other less controversial, more
specific, and previously tested statutory provisions.8 As a result,
courts could decide the cases based on the older statutes.
Gradually, however, courts began to comment in dictum that
contract provisions might also be unconscionable, using 2-302 as
an alternative to lend additional support to decisions.' Despite the
slow start, courts are now beginning to rely solely on 2-
302-particularly New York courts. Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,°
a recent case, is of significance because it exemplifies the
developing trend. In Jones the court reversed the process of using
4. REPORT No. 2 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 35 (1965).
5. REPORT No. 3 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 37 (1967).
6. See, text accompanying notes 7-23, infra.
7. Despite the fact that some jurisdictions adopted the Uniform Commercial Code
as early as 1954, Section 2-302 was not cited as authority until 1964 in American Home
Improvements, Inc. v. Macver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964). See, text
accompanying note 14, infra.
8. See, e.g., American Home Improvements, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964). See, text accompanying notes 14-15, infra.
9. See, American Home Improvements, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964).
10. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
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2-302 as alternative authority and used it as the primary rationale
for the decision. In passing, the court mentioned that the credit
charges were also statutorily too high.1
Plaintiffs, welfare recipients, contracted with one of the
defendant's door-to-door salesmen to 1urchase a home freezer for
$900.00. The total price including credit charges was $1,234.80.
The court allowed the parties to present evidence as to the
commercial setting at the time of the formation of the contract,
from which it was determined that, at the time of the sale, the
freezer had a fair market value of $300.00. In an opinion
emphasizing the need to protect the "uneducated" and
"illiterate" consumer from a "small but hardy breed of
merchants who would prey on them,'1 2 the court held the contract
price was unconscionable as a matter of law under 2-302 and
directed that the contract "be reformed and amended by changing
the payments called for therein to equal the amount of payment
actually so paid by the plaintiffs." 13 At the time of trial the
plaintiffs had paid $619.00.
The case is important for several reasons: (1) The court
openly acknowledged that fraud was not present; (2) the need to
protect the unknowing consumer was emphasized; and, (3)
unconscionability of price was straight-forwardly declared. This
decision exemplifies the need for legislation such as 2-302. It can
be lauded as an occasion when the court clearly held the bargain
unconscionable without having to strain older statutory or case
authority to fit the factual circumstances. But Jones is vulnerable
to critical attack as an example of the use of 2-302 to "rewrite"
a contract to read as the court feels it should have read, leaving
no criteria for establishing unconscionability in future cases.
The Jones facts present such an outrageous disparity between
"fair market value" and the selling price that the result is not
troublesome; the apparent lack of a definitive unconscionability
test is. The dictum, however, suggests factors to be considered
when evaluating the conscionability of a bargain. These include:
The buying power of the consumer (or lack of it); the education
or commercial experience of the buyer; and, closely following that,
his literacy. Undeniably, a test for unconscionability that weighs
such factors entrusts a court with broad discretionary powers. In
11. Id. at 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 266-67.
12. Id. at 190, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
13. Id. at 193, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
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lieu of mathematical formulae for the rate of interest or the
amount of credit charges in relation to sales price, as in many of
the existing consumer protection statutes, a balancing approach
will enable courts to act in the "gray areas" not covered by
specific statutes; areas that are exploited by sellers such as the
defendant in Jones.
If Jones does foreshadow the future of 2-302 an examination
of the significant cases leading up to it and cited in the opinion
as authority is valuable. In American Home Improvement, Inc.
v. Maclver,"4 decided on a disclosure statute relating to finance
charges and the first case to cite 2-302, it was stated:
In as much as the defendants have received little or nothing of
value and under the transaction they entered into were paying
$1,069 for goods and services valued at far less, the contract
should not be enforced because of its unconscionable features.,
Another important case cited in Jones was Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Company." Ora Lee Williams began
purchasing items at the Walker-Thomas store in 1958. While
making her first purchase the salesman encouraged her to sign
"some papers" and pay for the items on an installment plan. The
important provision in the form she signed, held unconscionable
on appeal, read as follows:
If I am now indebted to the company on any prior leases, bill
or accounts, it is agreed that the amount of each periodic
installment to be made by me to the company under this
present lease shall be inclusive of and not in addition to the
amount of each installment payment to be made by me under
such prior leases, bills, or accounts, and all payments now and
hereafter made by me shall be credited pro rata on all
outstanding leases, bills and accounts carried by me at such a
time as payment was made. 7
From 1958 to 1962 Ora Lee made purchases totaling $1800
at Walker-Thomas and payments totaling $1400. She did so with
a monthly welfare income of $258.00 for herself and her six
14. 105 N.H. 435,201 A.2d 886 (1964).
15. Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 889.
16. 350 F.2d 445 (1965). For a complete discussion of the case by the attorney who
handled the appeal see, Dostert, Case Studies In Consumer Fraud, THE BUSINEss LAWYER,
SPECIAL ISSUE: BusiNEss IN Tm GHETrO 153 (Sept. 1969).
17. Dostert, supra note 16, at 153.
[Vol. 7
COMMENTS
children. In 1962 Or:a Lee defaulted on a payment. A writ of
replevin was issued resulting in the seizure of all items purchased
from Walker-Thomas over the four-year period. Strongly
condemning the business practices of the furniture company, the
court, on appeal, relied on 2-302, found the contract
"commercially unreasonable," and refused to enforce its
unconscionable terms.1
8
Two important New York cases, New York v. ITMA 9 and
Frostifresh v. Reynoso, 0 followed Walker and set the stage for
Jones. ITM involved a complex fraudulent retail sales promotion
scheme. The customers, erroneously believing that they could not
only cover the cost but profit as well, purchased goods from ITM.
ITM charged prices ranging from two to six times their cost on
products. The court determined that the prices were
unconscionably high. Dictum in the case contained strong
condemnation of those who hide behind a business philosophy of
"Buyer Beware." The court said, "Let the seller beware too!"21
Frostifresh is remarkably similar to Joies on the facts.
Frostifresh brought the action to recover the amount allegedly due
on a sales contract for a home freezer unit, attorney's fees and
late charges. The contract was "negotiated" or rather the
Reynosos were persuaded to buy solely in Spanish. The salesman
told them, on learning that Reynoso had only one week left to go
on his job, that they would receive a $25.00 commission on the
sale of freezers to their neighbors. The contract subsequently
signed was in English and was not translated for them. The terms
stated the freezer price to be $900.00 plus additional credit charges
amounting of a total of $1,145.88. When at trial it appeared the
terms might be unconscionable under 2-302 the parties were given
an opportunity to present evidence as to the commercial setting.
At the conclusion of the presentation the court held that charging
a total price of $1,145.88 for an item that cost the seller $348.00
was unconscionable. However, they granted a judgment for the
seller for $348.00 plus interest from date of default.
On appeal the court reversed and remanded in order to
properly assess damages. The appellate court agreed that the
evidence supported a finding of unconscionability under 2-302 but
18. 350 F.2d 445 (1965).
19. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
20. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
21. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 54, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321 (1966).
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stated that the seller should be entitled to his cost, plus a
"reasonable profit," and shipping costs.2 2 Thus, in New York the
groundwork for Jones was complete.
Admittedly a simple checklist unconscionability test is
missing. What is clear is that the developing examination of
conscionability is a broad examination-one that considers all
phases of the commercial transaction. It is increasingly apparent
that other statutory and case authority is inadequate to provide
complete protection for contracting parties in the modern
commercial setting, particularly where standardized form
contracts are involved. The purpose of 2-302 as stated in the
comments accompanying the official draft is "to allow the cout
to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or the
particular clause therein and to make a conclusion of law as to
its unconscionability." That is exactly what occurred in Jones.
To be sure, such a position is the result of a policy decision-the
benefits of greater consumer protection outweigh the danger of
judicial interference with freedom of contract that may result
from the adoption of 2-302.
II. UNCONSCIONABILITY IN CALIFORNIA
California consumers, while not protected by 2-302, are not
left completely at the mercy of the "hardy breed of merchants"
referred to in Jones. The assertion that California courts can and
do use their broad equity powers to avoid enforcing
unconscionable bargains requires more detailed examination 4
Undeniably California courts do not matter-of-factly enforce all
bargains-conscionable or not. California has consumer
protection legislation-probably some of the best. 5 The discussion
must, then, not merely center on whether unconscionable results
can be avoided in some cases but also how they are avoided and
what effect the means used has on commercial law generally.
It has been proposed that California courts can, without the
aid of 2-302, accomplish the same results with less uncertainty 6
22. 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
23. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
24. See, text accompanying notes 40-43, infra.
25. E.g., Retail Installment Acts (Unruh Act), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 180-18-12.9,
2981-2984.3. For discussion of this legislation, see, Note, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 618 (1960).
See also, text accompanying notes 40-43, infra.
26. See, text accompanying notes 40-43, infra.
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A review of some of the cases cited and the various theories used
as authority for this proposition is necessary to an examination
of unconscionability in California. One method employed to avoid
enforcing a bargain is to make use of a court's power to
"interpret" the agreement. Perhaps the classic "interpretation"
case in California is Burr v. Sherwin-Williams.27 Expert testimony
established that the plaintiff suffered crop damage from using
pesticide manufactured by the defendant. The defendant relied on
his warranty disclaimer printed on the label of the product.
Seller makes no warranty of any kind, express or implied,
concerning the use of this product. Buyer assumes all risk in
use or handling, whether in accordance with directors or not!"
The defendant argued that this disclaimer was a permissible and
adequate disclaimer of any "implied" warranty of "merchantable
quality. ' 29 The court, construing the disclaimer strictly against
the defendant, concluded that it only limited his liability for the
"use" of the product and that it did not disclaim an implied
warranty of merchantable quality.30 As a result, the defendant was
held liable for the crop damage.
The opinion did not state that the attempted disclaimer was
unconscionable, but it was so strongly implied that the case is now
cited as authority for the proposition that California courts can
avoid enforcing unconscionable bargains by using their powers of
construction and interpretation 1 The fact remains that there was
27. 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
28. Id. at 693, 268 P.2d at 1047 (emphasis added).
29. Burr was decided prior to California's enactment of the U.C.C. The Uniform
Sales Act was in effect at the time and the "implied warranty" stemmed from CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1735 (West 1954). Section 1735 has now been replaced by CAL. CONIM.
CODE §§ 2314, 2315, and 2316 (Vest 1964). For a more recent case with similar facts
but a different result see, Mosesian v. Bagdasarian, 260 Cal. App. 2d 361, 67 Cal. Rptr.
369 (1968). The court distinguished the Mosesian facts from the Burr decision on the basis
that Burr suffered damage from the application of the liquid while Mosesian's damage
resulted from the ineffectiveness of the liquid. See also, Klien v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246
Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966). In Klein, decided after the adoption of the
U.C.C. but covering facts still controlled by the Uniform Sales Act, dictum indicated that
the U.C.C. does not curtail the liability imposed by the Uniform Sales Act upon sellers
for breaches of warranty nor does it extend their power to disclaim or limit liability for
such breaches. Further, the court, citing Burr, commented that despite the failure to adopt
2-302, "California courts exercising equity powers, have always assumed the
unenforceability of contracts which are against public policy." Id. at 102 n.8, 54 Cal. Rptr.
at 619 n.8.
30. 42 Cal. 2d 682, 695, 268 P.2d 1041, 1048 (1954).
31. Burr is cited by both the State Bar Report and the Marsh-Warren Report as
19701
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no discussion of unconscionability nor were there any standards
established for evaluation of the conscionability of future
disclaimers.
Estoppel can also be used to avoid unconscionable results. In
Monarco v. Lo Greco 2 the defendants orally promised to will all
their property to their step-son if he would remain on the farm
and work it with them. He remained, giving up other
opportunities for work and further education. The couple died
twenty years after making the promise but left the property to i
grandson. The court held that the grandson was estopped from
asserting the Statute of Frauds against the plaintiff. There had
been such a change of position that the grandson should be
estopped to prevent an unconscionable result. Alternatively, the
decision included dictum implying that where, as here, the
plaintiff had performed and others had received the benefits of his
performance, it would constitute unjust enrichment to uphold the
conveyance
3
In addition to interpretation and estoppel, a California court
may avoid enforcing an unconscionable contract by a finding of
fraud. Undoubtedly many contracts that contain unconscionable
elements were obtained by the use of fraud. However, it is possible
that no fraud is involved-or at least no fraud that as a practical
matter is provable under the traditional concepts of fraud. Such
was the case in Jones. What may be provable is that a reasonable
man under the circumstances, with all the relevant information
necessary to understand the agreement, would not have agreed to
the terms. In State Finance Co. v. Smith 4 this dilemma is evident.
The court used the gross inadequacy of consideration as evidence
of fraud, obviously seeking a way around enforcing what it felt
to be an unconscionable contract though it did not speak in terms
of unconscionability.
Another possible California alternative may be to attempt to
exemplifying how California courts can avoid enforcing unconscionable bargains by using
their powers of interpretation. See, text accompanying notes 40-43, 48-52 infra.
32. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950).
33. For more recent discussions of the doctrine set forth in Monarco see, Mosekian
v. Davis Canning Co., 229 Cal. App. 2d 118, 40 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1964) and White Lighting
Co. v. Wolfson, 68 Cal. 2d 336, 438 P.2d 345, 66 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968). While
acknowledging that the party would be estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds if
an unconscionable result would follow, both courts found insufficient evidence to establish
a finding of unconscionability.
34. 44 Cal. App. 2d 688, 112 P.2d 901 (1941).
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establish a duty of "good faith" on the party in a position to
dictate the terms of the agreement. There is some precedent for
the proposition that the controlling party must exercise good faith
amounting to something like "commercial reasonableness." This
doctrine stems from the California Supreme Court's decision in
California Lettuce Growers, Inc. v. Union Sugar Company.5 In
a suit to recover damages for the price of beets delivered by the
plaintiff growers to the defendant, the defendant acknowledged
delivery but refused to pay, alleging he was entitled to set-offs for
the amount of the price of the beets. The plaintiff obtained a
summary judgment by arguing that it was an illusory contract
because it contained no specific provisions for delivery, price, or
acceptance of shipments. The trial court agreed that the defendant
was not bound by the contract and held for the plaintiff.
The appellate court determined the agreement to be
enforceable. The court stated that the parties had dealt with each
other before, although they had calculated their prices by a
different method, that the method used in calculating price was
common in the industry, and that the plaintiff must be charged
with knowledge of industry prices. As to the lack of agreed-upon
price, delivery and shipments, the court held that the method
chosen was reasonable and known to both parties 6 Both parties
were bound because the defendant-buyer was under a duty of
"good faith" (something like commercial reasonableness) to
fulfill the contractual agreement3 7 It remains to be seen, however,
if a California court would accept an argument based upon a
theory that the person in a position to dictate the terms in the
negotiation process or supply the form is under a duty of good
faith (commercial reasonableness) to dictate fair and reasonable
terms.
The preceding cases exemplify some of the methods open to
California courts to avoid unconscionable results. They are,
however, pre-Code cases which were offered to the legislature as
evidence that California courts could avoid unconscionable results
through the use of their broad equity powers. Today the results
in similar fact situations may depend on whether the Code in a
35. 45 Cal. 2d 474, 289 P.2d 785 (1955).
36. Other U.C.C. sections that were enacted are now applicable to facts such as those
presented in Lettuce Growers. See, e.g., CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 2204, 2208 (West 1964).
37. 45 Cal. 2d 474, 484, 289 P.2d 785, 791 (1955).
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particular area has retained, broadened, or changed pre-Code
law?8 But the means of achieving a fair result open to a California
court faced with an unconscionable bargain remain essentially the
same. Other sections of the Code cannot prevent unconscionable
bargains-a fact which persuaded the drafters to include 2-302.
Other jurisdictions are using 2-302 despite the enactment of the
Code and consumer protection legislation. Forcing a conscionable
result out of a U.C.C. provision rather than a pre-Code Uniform
Sales Act provision is still accomplishing a fair result in a
circuitous manner. Arguably, a straightforward declaration of
unconscionability provides for better results and less uncertainty
in commercial law.
III. THE CALIFORNIA DECISION
Section 2-302 read:
Section 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or
any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the
time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract,
or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the
parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid
the court in making the determination? 9
In California the proposed Official Version of the Uniform
Commercial Code underwent rigorous examination. The
legislative subcommittee requested recommendations from three
principal sources: 1) The State Bar Association; 2) the Banker's
Association; and, 3) Professors Marsh and Warren of the School
of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. An examination
of the recommendations made in the respective studies is essential
38. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103 provides that:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall
supplement its provisions.
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
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to an understanding of the position taken by the Legislature, as
the responses to the proposed section 2-302 were strong and
varied.
A) California Bar Recommendation
The Bar report states:
The decision to delete this section from S.B. 1903 was based
on the belief that giving the courts unqualified power to strike
down terms they might consider "unconscionable" would
result in renegotiation of contracts in every case of
disagreement with fairness of provisions the parties had
accepted.4'
The report rejected the argument that in an "age of form
contracts" contracts are not "negotiated" in the traditional sense.
The report cited existing statutory provisions such as the Unruh
Act42 that provide consumer protection. Also rejected was the
argument that codifying the unconscionability powers in the form
of 2-302 would be a logical extension of the traditional power of
equity courts. Yet the report acknowledged that courts in
California have "liberal equity powers" and that these powers are
at times used to avoid enforcing what might be defined as
unconscionable bargains. Indeed, the report cited cases to support
the point that courts in California use "forced construction" to
accomplish the results that 2-302 was codified to achieve
directly. 3 The report's position was clearly based upon a belief
that existing methods of interpretation and construction open to
California courts provide built-in safeguards for the "freedom of
contract" absent in 2-302.
B) Caliobrnia Banker's Association4
As their final recommendation, the California Banker's
Association offered an alternative draft of the section. In essence,
however, the alternative was so fundamentally different that it was
not a rewording but a new section derived from the concept of
40. See, California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, The Uniform
Commercial Code, A Special Bar Report, 37 STATE B.J. 117, 135-36 [hereinafter cited as
State Bar Report].
41. Id. at 36.
42. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1801-1812.9, 2981-2984.3 (West 1954).
43. State Bar Report at 135.
44. See, Sixth Progress Report, supra note 2, at 402.
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"good faith" and not unconscionability. The proposed revision
was as follows:
If the court finds that the contract or any clause of the
contract was not entered into or agreed upon in good faith the
court may refuse to enforce the remainder of the contract
without such clause, or it may limit the application of any such
clause as to void any result 5
Part two of the proposed section was to be completely deleted.
The report based the recommendation on the thesis that the
word or concept of unconscionability is not "a legal word of art."
Nevertheless, it was retained in both the title and the phrase, and
thereby probably created more definitional confusion than it
eliminated'
To be sure "good faith" is defined in the Code, but there is
by no means unanimous agreement as to what is meant by good
faith in either of the two fundamentally different ways it is used
in Articles 2 and 3.47 The proposal is in essence a different
approach, one which avoids the issue of unconscionability. Indeed,
the argument that "good faith" is the corner-stone of the Code
and that courts can refuse to enforce contracts not made in good
faith to avoid unconscionable results really adds nothing to the
Code or to existing California law.
C) The Marsh- Warren Report8
The third comprehensive study submitted to the legislature
was an analysis of the former recommendations. The report found
45. Id. at 403.
46. Despite the fears expressed over using the term "unconscionable" in 2-302 the
term was not omitted from Section 2719(3). Section 2719 did not provide any more in
the way of a definition than did 2-302. Leaving room for speculation as to why the term
was less offensive in 2719(3) than in 2-302, the answer may well be that 2719(3) simply
does not hold the potential for judical interference in the commercial transactions that 2-
302 did or it may simply be an oversight on the part of the opponents of 2-302. Section
2719(3), as adopted in California, reads as follows:
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but
limitation of damages where the loss is.commercial is not.
47. See generally, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, §§ 1-201(19), 1-203, 2-103(b) and
3-302. See also, Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness,
30 CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963) and Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and The
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
48. See, SixTH PROGsRs REPORT, supra note 2, at 455.
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the Banker's substitution of good faith for unconscionability
unsound, stating that:
[A]t least we have centuries of equity precedent to guide us to
when a contract is unconscionable. No case exists to our
knowledge wherein a bargain was not enforced because a party
lacked honesty 9
Believing as they did, that "good faith" could be as elusive a
concept to define as unconscionability, they recommended the
section be phrased in terms of unconscionability.
The report also advised against complete deletion of 2-302 as
recommended by the Bar. Acknowledging, however, that the most
significant danger apparent in the wording of the official version
was the possibility that a court could strike down a clause or
contract that had been "thoroughly negotiated by the parties,"
they recommended: 1) The section be limited in its application to
"form contracts;" 2) a rewording of part (1); and, 3) that part
(2) be unchanged. The suggested rewording of part (1) was:
(1) Except with respect to a contract between merchants,
if the court as a matter of law finds the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made and if the court finds
in addition that the contract was prepared by the party seeking
to enforce the contract or such clause, the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result 0
Following their recommendation they argued that
although California judges already possess doctrinal tools to
achieve the result that this section calls for it is preferable to
allow what has previously been done by indirection, if not by
subterfuge, be done openly.5'
The report also counters the argument that courts will interpret
the section as giving them greater powers to refuse to enforce
unconscionable bargains by taking the position that "this increase
in judicial power if it is such, is justified by the proliferation of
form contracts in this country within the last few decades. 52
49. Id. at 457.
50. Id. at 455.
51. Id. at 457.
52. Id.
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D) The Decision
The Legislature was faced with three fundamentally different
recommendations on 2-302. That, coupled with the controversial
nature of 2-302, undoubtedly convinced the Legislature that a
cautious approach was prudent. Since all sides submitted that the
courts have the doctrinal tools (limited though they might be) to
avoid enforcing unconscionable contracts on certain sets of facts,
arguably the wisest or at least the safest course was to adopt the
Code without 2-302. 3 However, that decision should not preclude
further investigation or future. legislation if the dangers prove to
be small in comparison to the contemporary need for more far
reaching consumer protection than is available under existing law.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The arguments against the adoption of 2-302 seem to have
been overstated. The widespread adoption of 2-302 did not bring
about sweeping changes in commercial law nor did it lead to an
intolerable deluge of renegotiated contracts. The use of 2-302 has
been greatest in the retail commercial setting where standardized
form contracts are used extensively and the terms in such
instruments are not negotiated in the traditional sense. Rather,
they are dictated by the seller. Often these contracts are designed
to fit in between or to completely avoid areas covered by other
more specific statutory or case law. Section 2-302 allows a court
to reach a conscionable result without having to resort to
imaginative interpretations or a stretching of other legal concepts.
The growing use of 2-302 in other jurisdictions, which like
California have other consumer protection legislation, attests to
the need for 2-302 in the contemporary commercial setting. The
right to freedom of contract holds a high place in Anglo-
American legal tradition and care should be taken to protect that
right. Nevertheless, the right to freedom of contract should not
include the right to bind an unknowing consumer to an
unconscionable bargain.
A thoughtful and arguably satisfactory way to protect the
53. The subcommittee report reads:
Your subcommittee questions the advisability of introducing such a vague
term without specific definition as to its scope or effect. It is the
recommendation of the subcommittee that Section 2-302 in its entirety be
deleted from the proposed legislation.
SIXTH PROGRrss REPORT, supra note 2, at 340. See also note 45.
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truly negotiated contract and still provide protection for the
unknowing consumer is suggested by Professors Marsh and
Warren in their proposed amendment to 2-302. In light of the
demonstrated need for 2-302 and the apparent overstatement of
dangers in adopting it, California would be wise to reevaluate its
position and to give strong consideration to the adoption of 2-302
as amended by the Marsh-Warren Report.
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